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Abstract: This desk top research evaluated the effectiveness of Presumptive tax administration on 
revenue collection. The method of assessment and collection of presumptive tax were discussed as 
well as the challenges that are encountered by Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA) on 
presumptive tax administration on revenue collection. The challenges have negatively affected the 
collection of presumptive tax. The research findings revealed that the effectiveness of presumptive tax 
administration is affected by the high tax rates that were imposed by the ministry of finance relative 
to the income levels that the cottage industry earn on a monthly basis, high levels of corruption and 
the political interference that occur. The study recommends that authorities should implement a tax 
system that will provide mechanisms for the informal sector operators to graduate into the normal tax 
system as well as intensifying education and awareness campaigns to the informal sector operators. 
Keywords: effectiveness; Presumptive Tax Administration; Revenue collection; ZIMRA 
 
1. Introduction 
The study reviewed the theoretical contributions from other scholars and authors 
that relate to presumptive tax administration on revenue collection. It highlighted 
the research findings and conclusions that were drawn by other authors in previous 
studies that relate to this current study. 
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2. Presumptive Tax Administration 
According to Musarirambi (2013), presumptive tax is the indirect means of 
ascertaining an individual’s tax liability that differs from the general rules which 
are based on the taxpayer’s accounting records. Musarirambi further postulated that 
presumptive tax is mainly used when the anticipated income cannot be rationally 
determined. According to ZIMRA (2014), presumptive tax is a simplified tax 
system that is based on supposed income that allows the informal sector operators 
to pay a predetermined amount at a determined interval. Dube and Casale (2017) 
alluded that presumptive tax is based on presumed rather than the actual income. 
Iordachi and Tirlea (2016) noted that presumptive tax system may or may not be 
rebuttable in terms of its legal characteristics. Mabwe and Mugozhi (2018) pointed 
out that presumptive tax takes into account numerous procedures in which the 
‘desired tax’ base is not measured and instead it is inferred in simple indicators 
which are more easily measured than the base itself. Zivanai et al. (2016) however 
argued that presumptive tax system leads to a prospect of excessive and unfair 
taxing where an entity is taxed even when it incurs losses. From the above 
explanations, it clearly highlights that presumptive tax is a proxy for the standard 
tax. 
 
2.1. Historical Background of Presumptive Tax in Zimbabwe and Beyond 
Presumptive tax was introduced in Zimbabwe in a view of expanding the tax base 
which would result in increase in tax revenue collection as highlighted (Dalu et al. 
2013). Dube and Casale (2017) pointed out that the implementation of presumptive 
taxes in Zimbabwe was established after a research was conducted by ZIMRA 
from 2003 to 2005, but it only focused on the profitability of the informal urban 
transport sector. The legislative framework for presumptive tax is governed by the 
Income Tax Act (Chapter 23:06) section 36C which is read with the 26th schedule. 
Zivanai et al. (2016) state that in Zimbabwe, the remittance of presumptive tax to 
ZIMRA should be done on the 10th of April, July, October and January the 
following year.  
Iordachi and Tirlea (2016) highlighted that the design of a presumptive tax system 
should be based on a solid data analysis and that policy makers should take into 
account the segmentation of the business community and treat each sub-group with 
different proper policies. 
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2.1.1 Presumptive Tax Experience in Other African Countries 
According to the IMF (2007:21) in Dube and Casale (2016), more than 25 
countries in the Sub-Saharan Africa and 14 countries in Latin America have a 
special tax system for the informal sector operators. According to Joshi et al. 
(2014) the presumptive tax mechanism differs between countries in their notable 
features. 
In Tanzania, Gaddis (2014) noted that SMEs qualify presumptive tax system if 
their turnover is below the threshold of Tsh 20 million and it provide an incentive 
for maintaining books of accounts whereby turnover tax is charged to those who 
keep their accounting records whereas those who does not keep their accounting 
records make a flat payment. Dube and Casale (2016) alluded that as a way of 
solidification the enhancement of presumptive tax system, Tanzania Revenue 
Authority established the Block Management System with the aim of ensuring tax 
compliance through the identification, registration and collection of tax information 
from all informal enterprises in a specific geographical area. 
According to Wadesango and Mhaka (2017), the taxation of the informal sector 
operators was introduced in 2004 with presumptive tax on taxis and minibuses and 
other notable tax reforms were later on added which include Turnover Tax on 
small scale enterprises, Base Tax on marketers and Advance Income tax. Phiri 
(2013) stated that the Turnover Tax is charged at 3% of the total sales of all firms 
with turnovers of ZMK800 million. The Zambia Revenue Authority appointed tax 
agents who collect the base tax and presumptive tax revenue on minibus taxis and 
the selection of agents was done through a competitive tender process and the 
agents are paid a commission as indicated by Phiri (2013). The agents have no 
power other than just to collect the revenue only. 
Owuor (2015) highlighted that the presumptive tax in Kenya was introduced and 
applicable as a withholding tax on payment of agricultural produce at 2% of the 
gross amount paid. This was done mainly due to lack of proper record keeping and 
was found to be more convenient in the determination of correct taxes than 
receiving incomplete records using presumptive tax method of examination as 
noted by Owuor (2015). 
According to Owuor (2015:34) some common method of assessment in Kenya 
include: 
 Net worth; 
 Means test; 
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 Bank deposit; 
 Expenditure method; 
 Percentage mark-up method. 
 
2.2. Methods Used for the Assessment and Collection of Presumptive Tax 
As stated earlier, Musarirambi (2013) noted that presumptive tax involves the use 
of indirect means to establish tax liability that is different from the normal rules 
based on the taxpayer’s accounts. There are various methods that can be used for 
assessment and collection of presumptive tax. Wadesango, Mutema, Mhaka and 
Wadesango (2018) highlighted that the objective of tax assessment is to ensure that 
all taxpayers within a defined jurisdiction are brought to the tax net and are 
assessed in order to resolve all possible leakages. They further alluded that tax 
collection is based on the assessment made on income obtained from trade, 
business, profession or vocation. Iordachi and Tirlea (2016) state for each 
presumptive tax method there arise numerous incentive effects, the revenue effects, 
the level of system’s complication and administrative effects. Joshi et al. (2013) 
suggested even though their design vary depending on countries, the presumptive 
tax methods share the same commonality. ZINARA (2018) highlighted that the 
methods of presumptive taxation are effective instruments in reducing tax 
avoidance as well as matching the distribution of tax liability. 
 
2.2.1. Occupational and Sector Specific Standard Assessment 
According to Chukwuma and Effeeloo (2017), the occupational or sector specific 
standard assessment is a fixed lump-sum payment of tax that is to be paid by 
individuals engaged in a certain business profession. Mlay (2013) supported the 
above point by pointing out that the standard assessment is based on individual 
income, investment or business. Iordachi and Tirlea (2016) noted that flat tax 
liability is imposed on all firms that will be operating under the same occupation or 
trade. Iordachi and Tirlea (2016) further stated that the tax payment is based on 
average taxable income of a small number of taxpayers that are randomly selected.  
According to the OECD (2015), the standard assessment is mainly imposed on 
business activities with low levels of turnover and examples include the 
hairdressers, mechanics and fishermen. Iordachi and Tirlea (2016) point out that 
the Israeli Tachshiv was the most elaborated standard assessment. Zivanai, Chari 
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and Nyakurima (2016) assert that the tachshiv determine the income on indicators 
that are established by government in the specified industries. The occupational 
assessment is viewed for its simplicity in terms of low compliance and 
administration cost as noted by OECD (2015). Mlay (2013) alluded that the 
standard assessment enhances the vertical equity. 
According to the Tax Justice Network (2013) in Burkina Faso, the standard 
assessment is applicable on the informal sector activity that generates a turnover 
that is less than the stated amount of tax contribution whilst in Gabon, the lump-
sum assessment (impot forfaitaire sur le revenue) is used to tax individual transport 
operators, traders and small businesses. Utaumire et al. (2013) state that the simple 
lump-sum taxes have been in existence in Zimbabwe since 2006 on the cottage 
industry. 
However, it is not mainly favored by tax authorities as it results in poor revenue 
performance because the standard assessment method is based on average income 
on business grouping and not the true averages as noted by Tax Justice (Network, 
2013). The OECD (2015) stated that the standard assessment tends to impose high 
tax burden on lower income generating firms and distorts competition amongst 
firms with different sizes but are both subject to lump-sum payment.  
 
2.2.2. Estimated Lump-sum Assessment 
This method of presumptive tax is based on indicators or observed features that 
may include the size of the business, premises, skills and the number of employees, 
location, number of seats in the transport vehicle as noted by Chukwuma and 
Efeeloo (2017). Embuka (2015) highlighted that indicators for the estimated 
assessment method include the number of employees, skills of workers (carpenter 
workshops or garages) and the nature of equipment used. Iordachi and Tirlea 
(2016) support the above assertion by pointing out that the income from the 
taxpayer is individually estimated and centered on indicators based to a specific 
occupation or business activity. Embuka (2015) noted that the estimated 
assessment method uses a variety of techniques to come up with the taxpayer’s 
income which may be both simple and complex. Embuka further alluded that the 
simple techniques are based on single factors that might include taxpayer’s total 
assets, net worth or value of business assets whilst the complex technique uses 
factors or guides on profitability which vary by economic activity. 
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According to the OECD (2015), Denmark uses this method of presumptive tax on 
the shipping industry. Iordachi and Tirlea (2016) further assert that the French 
forfeit is a technic that resembles estimated standard assessment. The indicator 
based assessment method is less easy to misreport than the income based 
assessment method. 
However, Chukwuma and Efeeloo (2017) highlighted that this method involves 
some other elements of discretion on assessment that may invite corruption and 
inconsistences. Jonathan (2014) supported the above point by highlighting that the 
French forfeit is disadvantageous for the tax administrators as it is disposed to 
corruption by tax officers. The Tax Justice Network (2013) pointed out that 
excessive application may lead to not taxing income but the factors of production 
as it tends to depend on factors of production such as labor and capital. 
 
2.2.3. Presumptive Minimum Taxes 
According to Tax Justice Network (2013) the presumptive minimum taxes are 
levied based on the assumed levels of minimum income in a given year. OECD 
(2015) pointed out that the presumptive minimum taxation is viewed as an 
effective mechanism to raise revenue from the informal business. According to 
Olaitan (2016:67) the presumptive minimum taxes can be categorized into five 
different forms which are: 
 Levied in lump-sum form and may or may not be graduated on the contingent of 
the firm size or volume of operation 
 As a percentage of turnover or gross assets 
 The use of lump-sum minimum taxes plus a percentage of turnover 
 The lump-sum amount as a percentage of turnover whichever is higher 
 The highest of the tax liabilities based on different tax bases. 
 
2.2.4. Lump-sum Minimum Plus Percentage of Gross Receipts 
It is the greater of lump-sum levy on presumptive tax and the specified of gross 
receipts. Tax Justice Network (2013) highlighted that this method is calculated as a 
percentage of the gross receipts, percentage of the net profit, paid up capital as well 
as turnover whichever is considered to be the highest. Chukwuma and Efeeloo 
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(2017) state that it is applicable in some jurisdiction and is assessed together with 
the percentage of gross receipts for each specific informal sector enterprise.  
 
2.3. Challenges Encountered in Presumptive Tax Administration on Revenue 
Collection 
2.3.1. High Tax Rates 
Helhel and Ahmed (2014) state that the high tax rates are the chief problems for the 
taxpayers. According to Dube and Casale (2017), there is perceived unfairness of 
the presumptive tax rates as the tax rates are too high and promote corruption. This 
is also supported by Dlamini (2017) who states that there is a perception that the 
tax rates are too high. Helhel and Varshalomidze (2015) concluded that high tax 
rates and difficult procedures in filing are the most crucial factors that causes non-
compliance of the SMEs. Helhel and Ahmed (2014) pointed out that the tax rates in 
Yemen are perceived to be too high and the general economic conditions give rise 
to the view that the tax rates are high. Sikwila et al. (2016) noted that the high 
marginal tax rates and in other cases the lump-sum fees prevented the informal 
sector to comply and pay tax. They further concluded that high tax rates tend to 
impel informal businesses into the underground economy. Wadesango, 
Mwandambira, Mhaka and Wadesango (2018) noted that the taxpayers who feel 
that the tax rates are high and punitive will tend to evade tax. Joshi et al (2018) 
pointed out that the high tax rates contribute to the informal sector operators to 
default paying their tax obligations. Fox and Murray (2013) supported the above 
contribution by pointing out that the high tax rates tend to discourage the informal 
sector firms from expanding and joining the formal sector. The high tax rates may 
discourage effort and entrepreneurship at the same time encouraging all manners to 
avoid paying taxes as indicated by Wadesango and Makerevi (2018). 
However, the setting of high rates by the Ministry of Finance based on ZIMRA 
research is a clear indication of inadequate cohesion between the government 
departments as noted by Dube and Casale (2017). According to Utaumire et al. 
(2013) the lack of involvement of the stakeholders in determining the tax rates 
resulted in the resistance by the informal sector.  
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2.3.2. Political Interference 
According to Joshi et al. (2014) the informal sector taxation will yield little revenue 
as it is organizationally challenging and possibly politically unpopular. The 
informal sector operators constitute a significant vote bank for politicians in Africa 
in general as noted by Dube and Casale (2017). Taxpayers have got a large 
political voice but contribute little revenue as highlighted by Dube and Casale 
(2017). According to Joshi et al. (2014) the politicians would want to keep the 
informal economy so as to garner for votes. The above point is supported by Katee 
(2017) who stated that the informal sector operators are always used as an 
enticement by the political leaders to earn re-election. According to Chukwuma 
and Efeeloo (2016), state officials and politicians turn a blind eye on the informal 
sector to pressurize government officials in order for them to reduce enforcement 
as the informal sector constitute a substantial vote for politicians. ZIMCODD 
(2014) states that in most cases, politics tend to override the economic thinking. 
Thus the political leaders have a strong incentive to exempt the informal sector 
operators from taxation to gain political support. Dube and Casale (2017) were of 
the opinion that some sectors in the informal sector operators are permitted to 
escape the tax net and it appeared to be politically motivated. They also stated that 
the political influence in the informal sector results in the selective application of 
the tax regulation. Munjeyi et al. (2017) concluded that the informal sector 
operators who are connected to a high political officer tend to be immune from tax. 
Ohaka and Zukbee (2015) assert that political interference by government officials 
and opposition members due to their positions of influence may lead to shortfalls in 
terms of collecting taxes in Nigeria. 
The politicians temporarily support the informality of businesses at times when 
they want election. Munjeyi et al. (2017b) state that those informal sector players 
who are linked to some high political office are immune to tax system. This 
signifies that there is a political interference in terms of collecting revenue from the 
informal sector and thus little revenue is collected due to political interference.  
However, Dube (2014) argued that the low revenue collection from the informal 
sector prevailing the political situation in Zimbabwe as many people tend to feel 
that the existing government is not legitimate and that the informal sector tax 
payers will tend to resist to paying taxes to government that they resemble as 
illegitimate. Dube also highlighted that many informal sector tax payers will raise 
concern that the tax collected will not be used in the interest of the national but is 
being used for narrow sectional ones. Helhel and Ahmed (2014) noted that the 
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public view that the government is not being responsible to taxpayers has been 
established as a challenge that the tax authorities are facing.  
 
2.3.3. Corruption 
Dube (2014) highlighted that the main problem facing many tax authorities in 
developing countries in tax administration is that of corruption. Sikwila et al. 
(2016) highlight that corruption remains present in all regions and its effects has 
persuaded companies to move into the informal sector and it is positively 
correlated with the growth in the informal sector in a particular economy. They 
further stated that if the tax officials are corrupt, it becomes a challenge to collect 
revenue from informal sector operators in that the taxpayers would have the belief 
that the amount paid was not for the government. This is supported by Katee 
(2017) who stated that corruption is one of the major undoing in Kenya. Corruption 
is defined as the abuse of public office for private gains (Dube, 2014). Corruption 
occurs in the form of bribes and force and bribes occurs when a tax official accepts 
cash in exchange of not enforcing the tax regulation. Akinboarde (2015) alluded 
that the indicators of corruption are strongly associated with low revenue yields. 
Dube (2014) points out that the main complainant from the transport operators was 
that the taxes were considered to be so high that they were left with little choice but 
resort to bribery. Dube and Casale (2017) stated that informal traders in the cross 
border section pay bribes at the ports of entry. They further stated that the cross 
border traders are of the view that one will not make profit whilst paying taxes at 
the border and thus they will resort to paying bribes to the tax officials. The above 
point is supported by ZIMCODD (2014) who state that tax officials are accepting 
bribes in return for low payment by traders at the ports of entries. Katee (2017) 
supported the point by suggesting that most stakeholders, from the senior 
government officials to Kenya Revenue Authority officials to petty traders 
understand that instead of paying tax, you can always pay your way out. 
Nyamwanza et al. (2014) alluded that corrupt practices compromise the ability of 
tax administrators to collect enough revenue for the national fiscus. They further 
stated that corruption was high among the tax authority officials. This clearly 
shows that corruption has a negative impact on presumptive tax on revenue 
collection as it is depriving the country of its deserved revenue and Joshi at al. 
(2013) pointed out that efforts to tax the informal sector economy increases the 
possibility of coercive or corrupt behavior by tax officials. 
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However, Masarirambi (2013) points that the lack of enforcement and follow ups 
by the tax authorities results in the system being compromised by corruption. The 
informal sectors have also shunned from paying taxes due to the lack of confidence 
and trust in the whole tax system due to the rampant reports of corruption practices 
by ZIMRA as noted by Munjeyi et al. (2017). Akinboarde (2015) stated that 
taxpayers may be unwilling to pay their taxes because of the officials that they 
perceive to be corrupt. This research seeks to determine whether corruption affects 
revenue collection. 
 
2.3.4. Unavailability of Information 
The informal sector is characterized by businesses that does not keep proper books 
of accounts and they are highly mobile in the sense that they do not have a fixed 
place of location (Dube, 2014). This becomes difficult for government to obtain a 
database of information regarding the informal sector activities, (Udoh, 2015). 
Katee (2017) suggested that government lacks relevant information like the amount 
of income that small and medium scale entrepreneurs receive annually. This is due 
to the fact of the invisibility of the informal sector and lack of appropriate data on 
the people operating such business. According to Dube (2014) the process of 
identifying taxpayers and ascertain tax liability is difficult if no information is 
available. There is no register for the informal sector traders in Zimbabwe and 
apart from the visible informal sector operators in the urban transport, cross border 
trading, flea market activities, obtaining information has remained a challenge for 
the tax authority as noted by Dube (2014). Udoh (2015) also supports the above 
point by stating that the non-registration of businesses in the informal sector has 
resulted in lack of statistical database. According to Zuriat (2016) the Uganda 
Revenue Authority established that the lack of a database for the informal sector is 
a challenge for taxing the informal economy. Utaumire et al. (2013) supported the 
above statement by stating that the authority should create a database full of all 
informal traders and issue them with business partner numbers denoting the areas 
where one operates and the type of business activity that is conducted. 
However, availability of information for the informal sector activities ensures that 
the taxpayers will know the taxes they should pay and how they are paid (Dube, 
2014). It also ensures that the tax officials are able to locate the informal sector 
business activities as well as to know the number of informal sectors within the 
country. 
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2.3.5. Cost Effectiveness 
There is a deliberate focus on the large taxpayers. The revenue gains from the 
informal sector is modest and for tax administrations under pressure to meet 
revenue targets, it is much easier to focus attention on large taxpayers than to 
invest in the informal sector (Dube, 2014). Institute of Economic Affairs (2013) 
pointed out that from a cost benefit perspective, it makes sense to concentrate on 
collections efforts on the formal sector especially for resource constrained 
authority. The high cost of collection from taxing the informal sector that has 
resulted in tax authorities increasing their efforts where they can get maximum 
revenue (Institute of Economic Affairs, 2013). Dube (2014) observed that one-
kwacha funding can produce more tax revenue when applied to the large formal 
firms that to the informal sector operators and hence the need to focus on formal 
firms. Joshi et al. (2013) state that collecting taxes and enforcing compliance 
among small operators tends to represent a particularly demanding task as it is 
poorly rewarding and offers few opportunities for informal payments. Tanui (2016) 
pointed out that the administration cost for the informal sector taxpayers can offset 
its revenue potential. Ohaka and Zukbee (2015) noted that the cost of collections is 
high in comparison to the limited revenue potential from the informal sector. 
Kinyua (2015) supported the above point by highlighting that the informal sector 
generates low revenue and as a result the tax administrations tend to focus on the 
large taxpayers. 
 However, in the findings Munjeyi et al. (2017a) pointed out that the fact that 
presumptive tax is still classified as ‘Other Tax Head’ means that the authority is 
committing itself and that they are not putting up effective mechanisms to collect 
revenue from the informal sector. Chukwuma and Efeeloo (2017) highlighted that 
many tax authorities do not have adequate resources in terms of labor and 
technology to initiate, monitor and enforce tax laws. According to Fox and Murray 
(2013) even though policy makers decide to tax the informal sector business, there 
might be little enthusiasm for diverting resources to other seemingly more 
productive uses to enforce taxation of the informal sector by the tax administration.  
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2.4. Possible Measure that can be implemented to Improve Presumptive Tax 
Administration on Revenue Collection 
2.4.2 Educating and awareness of the informal sector on presumptive tax 
Dube and Casale (2017) highlighted that more emphasis should be placed on 
education and awareness campaigns. Dalu et al. (2013) support the above point as 
they state that taxpayer education will enhance voluntary compliance other than 
carrying follow ups. They further stated that taxpayer education and awareness 
may be through preparing a clear explanatory material that tells taxpayers what 
they have to do, when they have to do it and how to do it. Chukwuma and Efeeloo 
(2017) in their study noted that the ability of the revenue authorities to ensure tax 
education and monitoring will greatly enhance revenue generation. According to 
Ebifuro et al. (2016) through tax education, the informal sector firms can be 
educated about the tax system and can be assisted to comply with the tax system. 
Munjeyi et al. (2017) supported the above contribution by stating that tax education 
imparts rules of good tax behavior and attitude towards taxation. According to 
Hove and Hove (2016), the tax authority should intensify tax education as well as 
public awareness campaigns in an effort to bring tolerant and acceptance that 
taxation is a duty for the nation and obligation for all rather than taxpayers to view 
it as a burden that intend to take away their hard earned cash. Machogu and Amayi 
(2013) supported the above contribution by stating that it is a tool that is designed 
to enable taxpayers understand the relevant tax laws and procedures. They also 
stated that education may be through different media such as newspapers, radio 
programs, websites and front-desk help.  
Ebifuro et al. (2016) investigated the causes of low revenue in Pakistan and 
concluded that an increase in literacy results in increase revenue collected. 
According to Munjeyi (2017c) the Mozambique Revenue Authority is in the 
process of negotiate with the Ministry of Education in an effort to emphasize that 
tax education will be a mandatory subject from primary to tertiary institutions. In 
Tanzania, Mozambique and Zambia significant amount is collected from the 
informal sector through awareness campaigns and collaboration with the informal 
sector (Munjeyi, 2017c). This clearly illustrated that education will provide 
knowledge to the informal sector firms on the importance of paying tax and 
complying with the tax laws of the land. According to the ZIMCODD (2014), 
education is regarded as a strategy of bringing the informal sector into the tax net 
for some of the taxpayers who do not fully appreciate their legal obligations of 
contributing to the national fiscus. 
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However, Ebifuro et al. (2016) argued that some studies have highlighted that there 
is no positive correlation between tax education and compliance. Munjeyi et al. 
(2017) also argued that education alone may not renew the minds of the millions in 
the informal sector to pay tax but it should be coupled with the political will to 
collect tax from the informal sector. Helhel and Ahmed (2014) argued that negative 
associations were reported between education and tax compliance in that the tax 
payers may utilize the opportunities for tax avoidance and tax evasion with 
increased fiscal knowledge.  
 
2.4.3. Formalization of the Informal Sector 
Joshi et al. (2014) noted that the formalization may stimulate growth in informal 
sector firms. They further stated that the benefits of formalization may potentially 
include the reduced need to pay bribes, provide free service or relocate to avoid 
complying with the tax rules. Scholars indicate that there are certain features that 
could encourage a transition from presumptive tax to the normal tax regime which 
include the possibility to claim and carry forward losses which could benefit SMEs 
during loss making periods. Efforts to formalize the informal sector may be 
through offering incentives for example in Denmark, it reimbursed 40% of their 
costs upon informal sector registration as noted by Munjeyi (2017c). 
However, Iordachi (2016) noted that the difficult formalization procedures can 
determine informal sector operators to operate in the informal sector. According to 
Dalu et al. (2013) the informal sector enterprises mainly transact using cash and for 
a taxpayer to register with ZIMRA there is the need to have a bank account. This 
in-turn will make it difficult for them to register. Utaumire et al. (2013) pointed out 
that the tax rates should be designed in such a way that it encourages the informal 
sector to graduate to the formal economy. They further stated that there is no 
defined plan to facilitate the informal sector taxpayers to graduate into the normal 
tax system. Dube (2014) indicated that there should be clear guidelines on how to 
graduate to formality. Joshi et al. (2014) stated that despite being aware of the 
potential benefits of formalization, some informal sector businesses may be keen to 
remain informal. Dalu et al. (2013) noted that the informal sector operators in 
Africa avoid being in the formal sector as they do not have the incentive to be in 
the formal sector as the perceived costs outweigh the potential benefits.  
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2.4.4 Review of the high presumptive tax rates 
ZIMRA should provide professional advice on what rates are reasonable and what 
is feasible in terms of implementation as indicated by Dube (2014). Fursion and 
Lysko (2014) alluded that tax administrators should frequently review their tax 
rates to consider the economic challenges. According to Dube (2014), tax 
authorities should take into consideration the constantly changing economic 
environment in reviewing and updating the taxes as well as consulting the informal 
sector operators and relevant stakeholders. Dlamini (2017) noted that as the tax 
rates are viewed as too high, the government should consider reducing the tax rates 
as they encourage evasion and business failure among the informal sector 
operators. Dube and Casale (2017) pointed out to the fact that the tax rates are too 
high and will resultantly encourage corrupt practices between the informal sector 
and ZIMRA officials. According to Sikwila et al. (2016) the lower marginal tax 
rates are expected to persuade many informal sector operators to comply and pay 
their taxes. Mlay (2013) stated that lower and simpler taxes are viewed easier to 
collect and administer as creating less inefficiency. Maseko (2014) supported the 
above assertions by highlighting that tax laws should be amended to give 
incentives such as lower tax rates for small business taxpayers. Zuriat (2016) 
alluded that Uganda conducted the amendments of the presumptive tax rates in the 
year 2014/2015 tax amendment act.  
According to Helhel and Ahmed (2014), the informal sector should be levied lower 
percentages in order to permit enough funds for business development and better 
chances of survival in a competitive market. Dube and Casale (2017) stated that 
there is need to lower presumptive tax rates for enterprises that keep the basic 
records of turnover. This will provide an incentive to maintain proper books of 
accounts by the informal sector enterprises. Gaddis (2014) states that in Tanzania, 
those who keep their accounting records pay tax based on their turnover whilst 
those that does not keep their books make a flat payment. Dube (2014) also stated 
that since the informal sector traders pay taxes in the form of Value Added Tax, the 
presumptive tax rates should take into account the highlighted fact.  
 
2.4.5. Fiscal Decentralization 
Joshi et al. (2014) highlighted that a radical reform to taxing the informal sector 
economy is to decentralize the responsibility for the informal sector taxation from 
the national to the sub-national governments. Local authorities have a stronger 
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incentive to collect taxes and may bargain with local associations whereas the 
national authorities may view the informal sector taxation as unrewarding, 
administratively difficult and politically costly to collect taxes (Joshi et al, 2014). 
The above point is supported by Kamuteku (2016) who highlighted that the 
presumptive tax can be outsourced to other government departments in an effort to 
reduce administrative costs and improve convenience of the informal sector 
taxpayers. Dube and Casale (2016) alluded that the objective of fiscal 
decentralization is the free tax authority so that it can focus on monitoring and 
selective audits of the informal sector. Utaumire et al. (2013) stated that ZIMRA 
has an option to appoint local authorities who will act as agents to collect and remit 
presumptive tax from the informal sector operators. The agents who will be 
collecting the presumptive tax will withhold 10% of the presumptive tax collected 
(ZIMRA, 2014). With effect from 1 January 2015, ZINARA was appointed as an 
agent for collecting presumptive tax for motor vehicles (ZINARA, 2018). Dube 
(2014) indicated that in some other developing countries, the local municipalities 
are collecting taxes in the form of levies and license fees. Dube further highlighted 
that evidence in Ethiopia show that regional governments can effectively levy taxes 
on the informal sector operators. 
However, according to Dube (2014), ZIMRA has the view that even municipalities 
are corrupt and are even struggling to pay their own taxes. Utaumire et al. (2013) 
supported the above assertion by pointing out that municipalities that act as agents 
for collecting presumptive tax on behalf of ZIMRA do not remit all revenue 
collected to the authority but instead divert it for their own use. Dube (2014) noted 
that one of the conditions to be considered prior to become an agent is that the local 
authority should be compliant with PAYE and VAT obligations. According to the 
ZIMRA Debtors Annual Report (2014) the City of Harare owed the authority 
USD40 million tax debt that resulted in unpaid taxes, interest and penalties to the 
authority. Dube (2014) noted a problematic relationship that existed between 
ZINARA and ZIMRA over the collection of toll fees in the country’s major roads.  
 
2.4.1 Reorganizing tax Administration 
There is the need for segmental organisation of tax administration, with separate 
departments to deal with small, medium and large firms. There segments will be 
tailored to suit the needs of the specific type of firms in terms of tax education and 
awareness campaigns by these firms, (Joshi et at. (2014). Joshi et al. (2013) noted 
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that the Ghanaian tax administration reforms implemented a strategy to orient 
themselves to different taxpayer segments with the initial focus on the informal 
sector segment. The segmentation of tax districts is encouraged as the promote 
efficiency in terms of administration of the informal sector taxation as noted by 
Ohaka and Zukbee (2015). According to Dube (2014), ZIMRA currently does not 
have a dedicated office for small taxpayers although it does have an office which is 
specifically dedicated to the large taxpayers as they generate much priority in terms 
of compliance monitoring, education and support services. Joshi et al. (2013) 
observed that the logic of such segmentation can be extended in making more 
specialized units of taxing the informal economy. They also pointed out that the 
Block Management System can be used in promoting compliance and registering 
all eligible traders within a particular sectorial or geographical area. Mlay (2013), 
alluded that under BMS, each business area is divided into geographical blocks in 
order to conduct functions of registering, assessing, collecting and accounting for 
the tax revenue. According to Zhou and Madhikeni (2013), segmentation of the 
taxpayer population can be done by treating them as distinct revenue possibilities 
comprising large, medium, small and micro taxpayers.  
However, Dube and Casale (2016) argued that the Block Management System 
involves a concentration of all tax functions which leads not only to poor internal 
controls and corruption but also arbitrary use of power. Dube and Casale further 
insisted that the BMS is not an effective too to administer taxes as a result of high 
cost that are incurred to raise the taxes from the informal sector.  
 
2.5 Performance of Presumptive Tax on Revenue Collection 
According to Udoh (2015), the effectiveness of tax administration is often 
supported by the quoted maxim the ‘tax administration is tax policy’ and the 
success of the effective tax administration of presumptive tax is mainly based on 
the regular interaction between the tax authorities and the taxpayers which involve 
less scope of enforcement. 
Haji (2015) and Udoh (2015:56) shared a different view by pointing out that the 
performance of presumptive income systems can be viewed in terms of the 
following: 
 Number of taxable categories; 
 Advantages and disadvantages of the presumptive tax system; 
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 Revenue generation for the government budget; 
 Number of registered presumptive income taxpayers; 
 Presumptive income taxpayer’s trend; 
 Improvement in economic growth. 
According to Haji (2015), the number of registered presumptive taxpayers in 
Tanzania increased significantly from 199448 in the period 2005/2006 to 376673 
in the year 2009/2010. Presumptive tax initially was designed to small businesses 
without business records but was extended to other small businesses with accounts 
in an effort to advocate for formalization as noted by Haji (2015). 
However according to Haji (2015), the increase in the number of presumptive 
income taxpayers in not only attributable to the improvement in the presumptive 
tax scheme but other administrative measures such as the Block Management 
System, tax surveys and patrols, tax severance and the tax audits. 
The increase in the presumptive income taxpayer trend can be largely be 
attributable to the simplified tax regimes that would have been implemented to 
bring the informal sector into the formal sector (Haji, 2015). 
However, Haji (2015), noted that the large number of informal sector operators 
may still be outside the tax net due to lack of tax knowledge, information and 
education about the tax system and its importance. Dube (2014) also argued that 
not only there is no system of determining the informal sector tax performance but 
the level of monitoring the informal sector tax collections seems to be lax. Dube 
further argued that despite total presumptive tax revenue figures available in the 
research department, some of the officials responsible for informal sector taxation 
are not aware of whether the information actually exist or not.  
 
3. Conclusions 
The study mainly focused on the relevant and identified literature on the overview 
of presumptive tax, the historical background of presumptive tax in Zimbabwe, 
establishment and application of presumptive tax in Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia, 
challenges and problems faced in presumptive tax administration, 
recommendations and the performance on presumptive tax administration on 
revenue collection. The essence of the research was to combine, integrate and 
critique the arguments and contributions of other researchers on the effectiveness 
of presumptive tax administration on revenue collection. It emerged that the 
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presumptive tax system is not effectively collecting revenue because the larger 
amount of what is collected is ending up in people’s pockets instead of the national 
purse due to high levels of corruption. 
 
4. Recommendations 
From the research findings, the research made the following recommendations: 
 ZIMRA should provide incentives for those informal tax payers that comply 
with the presumptive tax. The informal operators that comply with the presumptive 
tax should be honored for example at the tax appreciation day which mainly 
focuses on the large corporates that comply with tax; 
 ZIMRA should continue its fight against corruption within the authority. The 
anti-corruption mobile numbers should be made available to the informal sector 
operating places as well as the suggestion boxes in an effort to reduce the 
corruption levels. Anti-corruption campaigns can be advocated through television 
or be emphasized through the “Did You Know” platform on the ZIMRA website. 
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